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DANIEL HEMEL*
I
INTRODUCTION
Inflation indexing is an important and controversial issue in the design of tax systems and
transfer programs. The choice of whether—and how—to adjust policy parameters for inflation
carries significant political, distributional, and macroeconomic implications. In recent years,
indexing has gained particular attention in three policy contexts: (1) whether to switch from an
“unchained” to “chained” inflation index when calculating Social Security benefits; (2) whether
to make a similar unchained-to-chained shift when setting federal income tax parameters such as
bracket thresholds and deduction amounts; and (3) whether to index basis for inflation when
calculating capital gains. Hundreds of billions of dollars ride on the resolution to these three
questions.
Across all of these contexts, the debate over inflation indexing is generally framed in terms
of “accuracy.” When the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform chaired by
Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles recommended in 2010 that Social Security cost-of-living
adjustments be calculated using the “chained” Consumer Price Index (CPI), the commission
emphasized that chained Consumer Price Index (CPI) is “a more accurate measure of inflation.”1
The Center for a Responsible Federal Budget, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank that picked up
the chained CPI mantle after the Simpson-Bowles commission dissolved, likewise listed accuracy
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as its primary justification for chaining: “[P]olicymakers should ensure that the most accurate
measure of inflation is being used,” the group declared in a white paper, and “[a]n overwhelming
majority of economists from both parties agree that the chained CPI is a far more accurate measure
of inflation than the CPI measurements currently in use.” 2 When the Obama administration
proposed a switch to chained CPI across federal tax and transfer programs in 2013, it foregrounded
the “accuracy” argument as well.3
The case for capital gains indexing has proceeded on similar premises. For example, Reed
Shuldiner—in a comprehensive and insight-packed 1993 article on indexation—argued that
computing capital gains without adjusting for inflation produces an “inaccurate” result. 4 The
congressional Joint Economic Committee, in a 1999 report, similarly said that indexing is
necessary in order to “measure capital gains correctly.”5 Lawyers Charles Cooper and Vincent
Colatriano—in a 2012 article urging the Treasury Department to index capital gains for inflation
via executive action—wrote that capital gains indexation would “more accurately assess[] the
actual increase in a person’s wealth or purchasing power.”6 Accuracy-based arguments for capital
gains indexation sprung to life again in 2019 when President Trump asserted that he had the power
to index capital gains for inflation of his own accord.7
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Critics of chained CPI and capital gains indexation have joined issue on the accuracy point.
The AARP, which opposes the use of chained CPI for Social Security cost-of-living adjustments
(COLAs), has argued that chained CPI is “even less accurate than the current formula.”8 Hundreds
of economists who signed a letter opposing the use of chained CPI for Social Security in 2012
agreed that the annual Social Security COLA “should be based on the most accurate measure
possible of the impact of inflation on beneficiaries,” but disputed that chained CPI was the best
way to achieve that goal.9 More recently, in the debate over whether the Trump administration
should index capital gains for inflation via executive action, critics of the move have argued that
indexing capital gains, but not other elements of the tax code, would lead to the “mismeasurement”
of income—a direct counterpoint to the “accuracy” claim pushed by proponents.10
This Article argues that—across all three of these indexing debates (and several more)—
the emphasis on “accuracy” misses the mark in two respects. First, inflation is not a quantity that
exists in the world apart from how it is measured. It is not like the distance from London to New
York, which can be measured accurately or inaccurately. To say that chained CPI is more
“accurate” than unchained CPI is something like saying that a U.S. liquid pint measure is more
“accurate” than an imperial pint measure. We may have good reasons for using a U.S. liquid pint
rather than an imperial pint—or vice versa—but “accuracy” is not one of them. Likewise, we may
have good reasons for caring more about the month-to-month change in the price of a fixed basket
‘at This Time,’ WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-again-mulls-capital-gains-tax-cuts11568210829. On the new push for indexing capital gains via executive action, see generally Daniel Hemel & David
Kamin, The False Promise of Presidential Indexation, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 693 (2019).
8
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of goods and services (standard CPI) or about the month-to-month change in the price of a fixed
level of consumption utility (chained CPI), but neither is more “accurate” than the other.
Second, and more importantly, the adjustment of policy parameters over time is not, at its
core, a question of technical accuracy. How Social Security benefits ought to change year to year,
how the schedule of tax rates ought to change over time, and whether inflationary gains ought to
be included in the tax base are not questions of measurement. They are, instead, value judgments.
“Accuracy” in this context turns out to be both an illusion and a distraction.
Seeing through the mirage of “accuracy” is important not only because it offers a clearereyed view of the values at stake in indexing debates, but also because it opens up broader vistas
for tax and transfer policymaking. For example, rather than focusing on whether “unchained” or
“chained” versions of the Consumer Price Index provide more “accurate” measures of inflation,
we might ask whether pensioners and disabled adults ought to share in the gains from economic
growth. An affirmative answer to the latter question would suggest that Social Security benefits
ought to be tied to an index that tracks overall economic changes (e.g., nominal gross domestic
product) rather than an index that tracks only price-level changes (e.g., unchained or chained CPI).
Likewise, instead of a crimped choice between unchained and chained CPI for tax bracket
thresholds and deduction amounts, we might imagine tying tax system parameters to deficit levels
or business cycle measures. And instead of an argument about capital gains indexation framed in
“accuracy” terms, we might imagine a more direct discussion about whether (and how much) the
income tax should operate as a tax on wealth.
Each of these questions will require more than this short Article to answer. The modest
goal here is to show why indexing decisions ought to be “unchained,” so to speak, from a narrow
focus on “accurate” measures of inflation. Part II introduces the indices according to which tax
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and transfer parameters are adjusted and the contexts in which indexation questions arise. Part
III—the heart of the Article—presents the case against “accuracy” as an objective for parameter
adjustment. Part IV considers implications of this argument for participants in policy debates and
for scholars engaged in the law and macroeconomics enterprise.
II
INDICES AND CONTROVERSIES
A. The Index Menu
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), an agency within the Department of Labor, is the
primary producer of inflation statistics in the United States. BLS began to publish the CPI in 1919
after rapid price-level rises during World War I intensified interest in inflation measurement.11 For
most of its history, the CPI tracked price changes affecting urban workers.12 In 1978, the agency
introduced a new measure, the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), and
changed the name of the old CPI to the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical
Workers (CPI-W).13 CPI-U and CPI-W differ in the relative importance of their components: CPIU, for example, places a larger weight on housing, while CPI-W places a larger weight on
transportation.
In 1987, Congress directed the BLS to develop an experimental price index for elderly
consumers in addition to CPI-U and CPI-W.14 This measure—formerly known as “CPI-E,” and
recently retitled “CPI-XE”15— places a larger weight than CPI-U and CPI-W on certain index
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components (most notably, medical care) and a smaller weight on others (including food and
beverages and education). The Bureau of Labor Statistics describes CPI-XE as “experimental” and
emphasizes that “it should be interpreted with caution.”16 Because CPI-XE is based on a smaller
set of households than CPI-U and CPI-W, it is more vulnerable to the influence of outliers within
its sample. Even so, the differences between CPI-U, CPI-W, and CPI-XE are modest.17 Although
over time CPI-XE has outpaced CPI-U and CPI-W, there are some years in which CPI-U and CPIW rise more rapidly than CPI-XE.18
All three of these measures are Laspeyres price indices.19 (The name “Laspeyres” honors
the German economist Étienne Laspeyres, who pioneered the use of this type of measure in the
late nineteenth century.) A Laspeyres price index reflects changes over time in a base-period
reference basket of goods and services. To understand how a Laspeyres price index is calculated,
consider the following example, which uses the hypothetical numbers in Table 1:

16
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THE ECON. DAILY (Mar. 2, 2012), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2012/ted_20120302.htm.
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Table 1. Price and Quantity of Apples and Bananas Purchased by a Single Consumer Over Two
Periods
Apples

Bananas

Total

Period

Price

Quantity

Expenditure Price

Quantity

Expenditure Expenditure

1

$0.50

12

$6

$1

4

$4

$10

2

$1

5

$5

$0.50

10

$5

$10

The Laspeyres price index identifies the change in the price of the base-period (Period 1)
basket of twelve apples and four bananas. The Laspeyres price index “overlooks” the fact that the
consumer chooses to buy a different number of apples and bananas in the second period after the
prices of those items change. I place “overlooks” in quotation marks because Laspeyres was not
unaware of the fact that consumers might change the composition of their consumption baskets in
response to price fluctuations and other factors.20 The Laspeyres price index, though, is not a
measure of how consumption baskets change; it is a measure of how the price of a particular
consumption basket changes over time.
Here, the cost of the consumer’s basket of twelve apples and four bananas has risen from
$10 in the first period to $1 x 12 + $0.50 x 4 = $14 in the second period. Thus the Laspeyres price
index is $14/$10 = 1.4. The inflation rate calculated according to the Laspeyres price index is 40%.
In other words, it costs 40% more to buy twelve apples and four bananas in the current period than
in the base period.
An alternative to the Laspeyres price index is the Paasche price index, so named for the
turn-of-the-twentieth-century German economist-turned-politician Hermann Paasche. Instead of
20
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199-200 (1998).
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using the first-period bundle (twelve bananas and four apples) as the reference basket, as in the
Laspeyres index, the Paasche index takes the second-period bundle (five apples and ten bananas)
as the reference basket. Here, the cost of buying five apples and ten bananas has fallen from $0.50
x 5 + $1 x 10 = $12.50 in the first period to $10 in the second period. Thus the Paasche price index
is $10/$12.50 = 0.8, and the inflation rate calculated according to the Paasche price index is -20%.
In other words, it costs 20% less to buy five apples and ten bananas in the second period than in
the first period.
The Laspeyres and Paasche price indices are both categorized as “fixed weight” price
indices: they take a fixed basket of goods and measure how the price of that basket changes over
time. The difference is in which basket they choose: the Lasyepyres price index takes the base
period basket as the reference basket, while a Paasche price index takes the current period basket
as the reference basket. In general, the Laspeyres price index will yield a higher estimate of
inflation than the Paasche price index because consumers substitute away from goods whose prices
have increased more rapidly and toward goods whose prices have increased less rapidly or
declined.
A “flaw” in any fixed weight price index is that it fails to account for consumer substitution
in real time. Chained price indices (of which the Törnqvist index is a particularly prominent
example 21 ) seek to correct this “flaw.” I put quotation marks around “flaw” here because the
Laspeyres and Paasche price indices are perfectly accurate measures of what they purport to
measure: the change in the price of a basket of goods and services whose component weights
remain constant over time. Assuming again that the first period is the reference period, the
Törnqvist index for the basket of apples and bananas in the second period would be:

21
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≈ 1.07

This is the product of the ratios of the second-period price to the first-period price for each basket
component raised to the two-period average of its expenditure share. The inflation rate calculated
according to this formula would be 7% (that is, (1.07 – 1)/1).
When proponents of the use of chained CPI for policy purposes say that chained CPI
provides a more “accurate” measure of inflation than fixed-weight CPI, what exactly do they
mean? Chained CPI reflects an attempt to implement the “cost of living” concept. The change in
the “cost of living” is the change in the minimum expenditure required to attain the same level of
consumption utility as would be generated by a reference basket of goods and services in the base
period. The Törnqvist index provides an approximation of the change in the cost of living given
certain assumptions about consumers’ utility functions. The Laspeyres index, by contrast, provides
an upper-bound estimate of the change in the cost of living. A Paasche index would give a lower
bound. None of these formulas, however, can give us an exact measure of the change in the cost
of living or its upper or lower bound because we cannot directly observe the consumption utility
that consumers derived from apples and bananas and other goods and services across periods,
which may vary with a whole host of nonprice factors. For example, apples may taste better when
crime is low and the Mets are in first place.
The BLS introduced the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPIU) in August 2002, with estimates extending back to December 1999 (the reference period).22 In
most months, the change in the C-CPI-U is the same as or 0.1 percentage points lower than the

22
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change in the CPI-U.23 Over time, however, small differences compound. Thus, from December
1999 through December 2016, the C-CPI-U increased by 37.3 percent, 24 while the CPI-U
increased by 43.5 percent.25
The four indices discussed here—CPI-W, CPI-U, CPI-XE, and C-CPI-U—come nowhere
close to exhausting the full range of inflation measures produced by BLS and other statistical
agencies. They are, however, the primary options that policymakers consider when designing
inflation-indexed taxes and benefits. The next subpart considers the particular policy contexts in
which inflation indexing debates have arisen.
B. Indexing Controversies
1. Social Security Benefits
Social Security is often described as the “third rail” of American politics.26 It is also the
third rail of inflation indexing—the policy context in which inflation indexing battles are most
heated and the lens through which other inflation indexing controversies are often viewed.27 And
it is probably the most complicated example of indexing in practice. A brief bit of background,
therefore, may help to set the stage for the Social Security indexing debate.

23

Id. at 5.
Table 24C. Historical Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U): U.S. City Average, All
Items, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Aug. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/cpi/additional-resources/chained-cpitable24C.pdf.
25
CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Jan. 6,
2020).
26
See, e.g., Terry Weiner, Touching the Third Rail: Explaining the Failure of Bush’s Social Security Initiative, 35
POL. & POL’Y 872, 872 (2007).
27
See, e.g., David Dayen, The Biggest Trojan Horse in the Republican Tax Plan, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/145688/biggest-trojan-horse-republican-tax-plan (“Even if this specific legislation
[adopting chained CPI for income tax parameters] doesn’t touch Social Security, make no mistake: It puts Social
Security under threat.”); Using the Chained CPI in the Tax Code: Will Social Security Be Next?, NAT’L COMM. TO
PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.ncpssm.org/documents/general-archives2017/using-chained-cpi-tax-code-will-social-security-next (“The proposal in the House and Senate Republicans’ tax
reform plan to move to a ‘chained’ Consumer Price Index (CPI) to calculate increases in the tax code brackets and the
standard deduction can only be seen as part of a broader plan to extend the use of this index when adjusting Social
Security benefits for inflation. It is the elephant’s nose under the tent.”).
24

10
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516473

Retired workers receive monthly Social Security benefits based on their “primary insurance
amount,” which is calculated by multiplying “average indexed monthly earnings” by a series of
percentage replacement factors. Average indexed monthly earnings are based on the worker’s
highest thirty-five years of earnings in covered employment. Once a worker becomes eligible for
Social Security retirement benefits, her benefit amount grows based on the Social Security cost of
living adjustment (COLA).28 This scheme raises two indexing-related questions: (1) what index
should be used to calculate average indexed monthly earnings?; and (2) what index should be used
to calculate the COLA?
For example, imagine an individual born in 1960 who begins collecting the Social Security
retired-worker benefit in 2022. Let’s say that she earned $50,000 in the year 2000 and that the year
2000 will be one of the thirty-five years factored into her average indexed monthly earnings
amount. One question is how much her $50,000 in year 2000 dollars should count for when
calculating her average indexed monthly earnings, and thus her primary insurance amount, in
2022. A second question is how much her Social Security benefits should increase each year after
she begins collecting in 2022.
Congress has answered the first question by choosing the “national average wage index,”29
which tracks the nominal change in the mean taxable compensation reported by employers year
after year.30 The national average wage index is (by design) not an inflation index; it is a measure
of something else entirely (wage growth). For the second question (the cost-of-living adjustment),
Congress has chosen CPI-W.31 This latter choice is, on first glance, somewhat surprising: after all,

28

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL SECURITY PLANNER 8-9 (May 7, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42035.pdf.
42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(B)(ii).
30
Net Compensation Defined, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/netcomp.html (last visited
Jan. 6, 2020).
31
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL SECURITY: COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-803.pdf.
29
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CPI-W tracks changes in the consumption patterns of urban workers, while Social Security
beneficiaries are typically out of the workforce. The reliance on CPI-W can be explained
historically by the fact that Congress adopted the cost of living adjustment provision in 1972,32
which was before the advent of CPI-U or CPI-XE. And the choice of index has stuck.
Proposals to shift from the national average wage index to an inflation-focused measure
for calculating the primary insurance amount have emerged at various points.33 The question of
wage indexing is interesting and important; it has not, however, been a primary focus of
policymakers’ attention over the past decade. More recently, debates about Social Security reform
have centered on two major proposals to change the cost-of-living adjustment formula. The first—
which has received the most attention—would tie cost-of-living adjustments to the C-CPI-U.34
Because C-CPI-U tends to grow at a slightly slower rate than CPI-W, this proposal would have
the effect of reducing benefits over time. In December 2018, the Congressional Budget Office
estimated that tying cost-of-living adjustments to C-CPI-U instead of CPI-W for Social Security
benefits would reduce benefits—and thereby reduce the federal deficit—by $134 billion over the
next decade. 35 Applying a similar change to other benefit programs with cost-of-living
adjustments—including civil service and veterans’ pensions and Supplemental Security Income—
would reduce benefits (and the deficit) by an additional $33 billion over a decade.36 Then-President

32

Robert M. Ball, Social Security Amendments of 1972: Summary and Legislative History, SOC. SECURITY BULL.,
(Mar. 1973) https://www.ssa.gov/history/1972amend.html.
33
For an overview, see John F. Cogan & Olivia S. Mitchell, Perspectives from the President’s Commission on Social
Security Reform, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 149, 158-59 (2003).
34
See, e.g., Editorial, A Better Stat for Inflation, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-better-stat-for-inflation/2012/11/25/592e4ad4-3405-11e2-bb9b288a310849ee_story.html (endorsing shift to chained CPI for Social Security cost of living adjustments).
35
CONG. BUDGET OFF., USE AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF INFLATION TO INDEX SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER
MANDATORY PROGRAMS (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2018/54752.
36
Id.
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Obama included a proposal for chained CPI in his fiscal year 2014 budget, though he omitted the
proposal from subsequent budgets after strong political backlash.37
A second proposal—championed by Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, among others—
would link Social Security cost-of-living adjustments to CPI-XE.38 The effect of this proposal on
benefit levels and deficits would depend on which index increases at a faster rate. Due largely to
rising health care costs, CPI-XE has generally grown more rapidly than CPI-W and CPI-U in recent
years, though there is no guarantee that the trend will continue.
2. Tax Thresholds
While the use of chained CPI for Social Security has been debated for several years,
chained CPI for tax thresholds had garnered less attention until 2017, when congressional
Republicans included a chained CPI provision in their $1.4 trillion tax cut bill.39 That law, as
passed, provides that inflation-indexed thresholds in the Internal Revenue Code—including the
bracket cutoffs, the maximum earned income tax credit, the standard deduction amounts, and the
caps on contributions to tax-preferred retirement plans—will increase with chained CPI (C-CPIU) rather than CPI-U.40
The use of C-CPI-U rather than CPI-U for bracket changes and the standard deduction will
mean that more income is subject to higher tax rates. The use of C-CPI-U for the earned income
tax credit (EITC) will lead to smaller EITC payouts. The net effect of these and other changes to
tax liability resulting from the switch to C-CPI-U will be to raise revenue by $133.5 billion over
the 2018–2027 period (and more afterwards), partly offsetting the negative revenue effects of the

37

For a catalog of congressional Democrats’ negative responses to President Obama’s chained CPI proposal, see
Andrew Johnson, Democrats Slam Obama’s Chained CPI Proposal, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 5, 2013),
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/democrats-slam-obamas-chained-cpi-proposal-andrew-johnson.
38
Social Security Expansion Act, S. 478, 116th Cong. §3(b) (2019).
39
Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
40
Id.
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tax cuts elsewhere in the same bill.41 Somewhere around half of those costs will be borne by the
top 20 percent of taxpayers by income.42
3. Indexing Capital Gains for Inflation
Proposals to index capital gains—which are currently not indexed at all—have percolated
for several decades. Without indexing, a taxpayer calculates gain and loss on the sale or exchange
of an asset by subtracting “basis”—which, in the simplest case, is the price in nominal dollars that
the taxpayer paid when purchasing the asset—from the amount realized. The result is that taxable
gains accrue purely by virtue of inflation. Proponents of indexing basis for inflation argue that the
non–indexation status quo therefore leads to the inaccurate measurement of income.43
In 1982 and several times thereafter, legislation to index basis for inflation passed one
house of Congress, but it has never become law.44 On two occasions, proponents of indexation
have pressed the White House to index basis for inflation via executive action—specifically, by
ordering the Treasury Department and the IRS to issue a regulation that construes the term “cost”
in the statutory definition of “basis” to be an asset’s real, rather than nominal, cost. The first such
push came in the early 1990s, when President George H.W. Bush was in office.45 At the time, the
leading presidential indexation advocates were explicitly agnostic as to the particular index used.46
More recently, several advisers to President Trump as well as allies of the administration outside
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government have urged him to do the same. 47 President Trump reportedly told advisers in
September 2019 that he would not move ahead with indexing capital gains for inflation, but might
reconsider it later.48 Now that chained CPI (and specifically, C-CPI-U) is the index used for other
tax parameters, it seems likely that a future capital gains indexation proposal would likewise tie
the calculation of basis to C-CPI-U rather than another index.49
III
ACCURACY AS A DISGUISE FOR VALUE JUDGMENTS
The central argument of this Article is that there is no one “accurate” measure for how
policy parameters should be adjusted over time to account for inflation. The adjustment of tax and
transfer parameters is, instead, primarily a value judgment for which no macroeconomic measure
can substitute. Once one considers the arguments for adjustment and the features of different price
indices, moreover, the normative case for C-CPI-U turns out to be uneasy at best.
A. “Accuracy” and Social Security Indexation
Recall that C-CPI-U is an approximation—and only that—of the cost of attaining the same
level of consumption utility as would be generated by the reference basket of goods and services
in the base period. For proponents of using C-CPI-U to calculate Social Security COLAs, the
justificatory burden is to explain why the guidepost for adjustment should be the change in the CCPI-U.
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C-CPI-U is consistent with at least one function of the Social Security system. Social
Security’s Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program can be understood as
a form of forced consumption smoothing. Because of the diminishing marginal utility of
consumption, individuals maximizing their own expected utility will want to smooth consumption
over time and across states of the world. With OASDI, we transfer some amount of consumption
from our working years to years in which we are unable or less able to work due to seniority or
disability. Accomplishing this through a mandatory program addresses adverse selection problems
that plague private-sector wage insurance schemes. Inflation indexing seeks to ensure that
consumption utility remains steady throughout our lifetimes. The use of C-CPI-U is broadly
consistent with this objective: it ensures—or tries to—that retirees, survivors, and disabled workers
can derive the same amount of consumption utility from spending their OASDI benefits each
year.50
Social Security is not, however, exclusively a mechanism for consumption-smoothing. The
OASDI program is also a mechanism for redistribution, and this is even more the case for Social
Security’s Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. How much we ought to redistribute
depends on some weighing of distributive benefits against efficiency costs. Distributional goals
are likely to vary across time periods, but not necessarily according to C-CPI-U. Overall economic
growth and changes in income and wealth inequality—as well as changes in price levels—shape
our distributional objectives.51 All this would counsel in favor of a formula for cost-of-living
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adjustments that would incorporate growth measures (e.g., nominal GDP) and inequality measures
(e.g., the Gini coefficient). For instance, if real GDP increased significantly and the wealth gap
widened but price levels remained constant, we presumably would want to redistribute more than
we already do, regardless of whether C-CPI-U or any other inflation index showed an increase.
Seen in this light, C-CPI-U no longer looks like an especially attractive peg for Social
Security cost of living adjustments. CPI-W—which typically outpaces C-CPI-U—will likely come
closer than C-CPI-U to capturing the range of considerations that ought to enter the cost-of-livingadjustment calculus. But framing the choice as between CPI-W and C-CPI-U (or CPI-XE) restricts
the menu of options unduly. If inflation is not the only reason why Social Security benefits should
change over time, then inflation measures should not be the only inputs to the cost-of-living
adjustment calculation.52
Another possibility—quite apart from the proposal for a blended index that accounts for
inflation, growth, and inequality—is not to adjust benefits and tax thresholds automatically but
instead to rely on Congress to periodically recalibrate those parameters via legislation. That was,
again, how Social Security until the 1970s. Of course, Congress can recalibrate policy parameters
via legislation through whatever formula it adopts for automatic adjustment. The decision to index
and the choice of index simply establish a default rule that applies in the event of congressional
inaction.
Seen in that latter light, it is not obvious that the optimal default rule should reflect an
estimate of the optimal change in redistribution across time. For example, Congress—knowing
that future legislatures will face pressure from voters and interest groups to raise benefit levels—
may choose an index that appreciates at a slower rate in order to counteract expected political
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forces. A switch from CPI-W to C-CPI-U may be justified on these grounds, though if C-CPI-U
is the appropriate measure for that purpose, it is by pure happenstance. Conversely, Congress—
knowing that future legislatures will face pressure to favor the rich—may choose an index that
appreciates at a faster rate, such as an unchained CPI-W or unchained CPI-U. The key point for
our purposes is that the optimal default rule does not necessarily reflect a measure of anything
other than a crude balancing of egalitarian and efficiency-enhancing objectives, perhaps with a
dose of political economy prognostication as well.
B. “Accuracy” and the Indexation of Tax Code Parameters
The argument in favor of C-CPI-U for indexing tax code parameters such as the bracket
thresholds runs into similar obstacles. Whether to index bracket thresholds for inflation and, if so,
what index to use, are not questions of accuracy. Rather, they are at their core choices about how
much revenue we want to raise and from whom. There is no obvious reason why, for example, the
taxable income threshold at which the 37 percent marginal rate kicks in should move in synchrony
with the cost of attaining a particular amount of consumption utility. An inflation index that
increases at a faster pace will raise less revenue from high-income households; an index that
increases at a slower rate will raise more. One choice of index might be normatively more attractive
than another, but not because it better measures anything other than our shared values.
Many commentators do not see the issue this way. Reed Shuldiner, for example, writes that
“inflation can distort a tax structure” and that “indexation can prevent such distortion.”53 It is not
clear whose behavior is being distorted though. Inflation without indexation certainly can change
the tax structure. To illustrate with an absurdly long timeframe: If we keep the current rate schedule
in place for the next 440 years and inflation proceeds at a 2 percent rate, the threshold at which the
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37 percent rate kicks in for joint filers—$600,000 in tax year 2018—will be the equivalent of $100.
We would, for all practical purposes, have a 37 percent flat rate. Everyone—but especially lowincome households—would see their average rates rise. But is this a distortion?
In one sense, yes. Income taxes distort behavior, and an inflation index that increases at a
slower rate results in higher income taxes. The “distortion” from non-indexation, though, is no
different from the distortion from explicit rate hikes. Higher income taxes, moreover, also lead to
more government revenue, which could be used to pay down the national debt, produce more
public goods, or distribute larger amounts to low-income households. These may be good or bad
results (and readers will likely disagree on whether they are good or bad). But the goodness or
badness of higher taxes, smaller deficits, more public goods, and more redistribution does not
depend on whether CPI-U or C-CPI-U is a more “accurate” measure of anything. If one wants the
government to raise more revenue, then one should favor C-CPI-U over CPI-U and no indexation
over C-CPI-U. “Accuracy” is, again, of little relevance.
While the choice of index (or the choice not to index) clearly has distributional
implications, those implications are themselves nonobvious. An inflation index that increases at a
slower pace makes taxes higher and causes the rate schedule to reach its peak more quickly in realdollar terms. It in that sense makes the tax schedule less graduated, though that does not necessarily
mean less redistributive. 54 Lower- and middle-income households will pay more than they
otherwise would, but they may also get more back in public goods and cash grants. Put somewhat
differently, inflation without indexing (or, less dramatically, using C-CPI-U instead of CPI-U for
inflation indexing) makes our tax system look more Nordic: higher average tax rates across the
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income distribution, but more government revenue-raising and more room for government
spending as a result.55
Finally, as with Social Security benefits, we might think of indexing tax parameters as an
exercise in legislative default rule-setting. If we did not index bracket thresholds for inflation,
Congress presumably would intervene at some point in the next 440 years and adjust those
parameters itself. The question that indexing addresses is what default rule should prevail absent
legislative action. If we are worried about undertaxation by future Congresses, then we might favor
no indexation or (a distant next-best) C-CPI-U. If we are worried about the growth of the federal
government and adopt a “starve-the-beast” mindset, we might opt for CPI-U or any of a number
of other measures, for example, bracket thresholds rise with nominal GDP, bracket thresholds rise
5 percent each year regardless of inflation, and so on. Again, since there is no apparent reason why
tax parameters ought to rise with the particular definition of the cost of living that the Törnqvist
index seeks to implement, there is no obvious reason why chained CPI ought to take priority over
any other index or no index at all. Any such argument will have to be made on terrain other than
technical accuracy.
C. “Accuracy” and Indexing Capital Gains
The debate over indexing capital gains is the last refuge of “accuracy” arguments.
Supporters say that indexing would “more accurately assess[] the actual increase in a person’s
wealth or purchasing power.”56 And if the goal is to tax only real—rather than nominal—changes
in wealth, then indexing serves a purpose. But it is not at all obvious that our goal should be to tax
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only real changes in wealth. Here again, the appeal to “accuracy” substitutes a technical argument
for a normative one.
To better understand this point, consider the well-known result in public finance that a
mark-to-market income tax approximates a tax on the nominal risk-free return or—alternatively—
an annual wealth tax.57 That is, a proportionate mark-to-market income tax theoretically exempts
risky returns, and so we are left with a tax on the risk-free component (this is a version of the
classic Domar-Musgrave result).58 A 40 percent mark-to-market income tax when the nominal
risk-free return is 5 percent approximates a 2 percent wealth tax.59 When the nominal risk-free
return rises or falls, the effective annual wealth tax rate rises or falls too.
Seen in this light, indexation simply reduces the effective annual wealth tax. If the rate of
inflation is 3 percent, then indexing transforms what was an annual wealth tax of 2 percent (that
is, 0.4 x 0.05) into an annual wealth tax of 0.8 percent (that is, 0.4 x 0.02).60 That, again, may be a
good thing if we want a lower wealth tax and a bad thing if we want a higher wealth tax. It is not,
however, a question about “accuracy.”
The discussion in the previous two paragraphs elides important qualifications that
complicate the capital gains indexing decision. One is that our actual capital income tax is not
mark-to-market. Indexing decisions therefore potentially affect “lock-in”61 whereas a mark-to-
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market income tax or annual wealth tax would not. A second is that rates are not flat and losses
are not fully deductible, so the classic Domar-Musgrave result does not apply perfectly to the
world. The joint determination of the capital income tax rate and the inflation index therefore
affects the tax burden on risk—a higher tax rate with indexing burdens risk more than a lower tax
rate without indexing. A third qualification concerns the treatment of supernormal returns. If we
want to raise the tax burden on supernormal returns relative to the risk-free return—for example,
because we think that supernormal returns represent rents—then that would be a reason to raise
the capital income tax rate and to index. If we want to reduce the tax burden on supernormal returns
relative to the risk-free return—for example, because we think that supernormal returns reflect
rewards for innovation that the government ought to amplify—then that would be a reason to
reduce the capital income tax rate and not index.62 Finally, indexing capital gains but not other
elements of the tax code would open the door to arbitrage opportunities, which is one reason why
proponents of capital gains indexing generally agree that it ought to apply to interest and related
elements of the tax code as well.63 The administrative and compliance costs of complete indexing,
though, may be substantial—and sufficient to cause us to call off the whole endeavor. In sum, the
choice of whether to index capital gains for inflation is difficult. But it is ultimately a question of
policy rather than a matter of measurement.
IV
IMPLICATIONS
This Article has focused on the relatively narrow issue of whether and how to index policy
parameters for inflation. The central argument is a negative claim: Indexation is not—or ought not
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to be—primarily a question of “accuracy.” A fixed weight (Laspeyres or Paasche) price index can
be an accurate measure of the change in the price of a fixed basket of goods and services, while a
chained (Törnqvist) index can be a best-guess estimate of the change in the price of a given level
of consumption utility, though we can never know for sure because we cannot directly observe
utilities. These observations don’t help us much, though, in deciding how to adjust policy
parameters over time. Those decisions depend on changes in nominal wages, nominal GDP,
income inequality, political economy, and redistributive preferences, in addition to inflation.
This discussion (hopefully) helps us better understand the role of macroeconomic measures
in the law. By basing year-to-year changes in policy parameters on measures of inflation,
lawmakers outsource difficult distributional decisions to the realm of macroeconomics. This is not,
though, a situation in which outsourcing leads to satisfactory results. In deciding how much to tax
and transfer, we consider—and ought to consider—a range of factors in addition to price levels.
Why, then, should price-level changes alone determine changes in how much we tax and transfer?
The decision to outsource distributional decisions is not necessarily borne out of ignorance.
The appeal to macroeconomic measures may instead be instrumentally rational for a number of
reasons. In some cases, choosing one index over another—or indexation over non–indexation, or
vice versa—allows lawmakers to better achieve their distributional goals without necessarily
stating their motivations. Relatedly, indexation may serve to reduce lawmakers’ decisional costs
or may structure future decisional environments in politically useful ways. Indexation, in other
words, may be a strategically valuable tool even if it is a dubious normative basis for policy
parameter adjustment.
The analysis here also might suggest that decoupling year-to-year policy parameter
changes from inflation can—perhaps surprisingly—create new space for law and macroeconomics

23
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516473

to operate. One reason why we might want to adjust policy parameters year to year is
macroeconomic stabilization. We might, for example, want tax rates and transfers to move
countercyclically—responding to real growth (or lack thereof) rather than or in addition to price
level changes. Loosening the link between policy-parameter changes and inflation may open a
discussion about how we think taxes and transfers ought to adjust to new macroeconomic
conditions, with price levels being one of many conditions that we could consider.
Finally, a focus on inflation indexing serves as a reminder of the law and macroeconomics
movement’s distributive stakes. Indexing policy parameters for inflation—which might at first
glance appear to be a technical question of macroeconomic measurement—turns out to be very
much a question of who owes what to whom. The law and (micro)economics movement has faced
criticism—some of it warranted—for overlooking or sidelining distributional impacts in its
analysis.64 Law and macroeconomics can learn a lesson from that failure and follow a different
course.
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